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The survival of the welfare state
Abstract
This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated
voting, where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution. A key result is that the future
constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution, since this affects
both private investments and the future distribution of voters. The model features multiple equilibria. In
some equilibria, positive redistribution persists forever. In other equilibria, even a majority of
beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period.
Skill-biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely.
The Survival of the Welfare State
By JOHN HASSLER, JOSE´ V. RODRI´GUEZ MORA, KJETIL STORESLETTEN,
AND FABRIZIO ZILIBOTTI*
This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfect equilibria in
a model with repeated voting, where agents vote over distortionary income redis-
tribution. A key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies
depends positively on current redistribution, since this affects both private invest-
ments and the future distribution of voters. The model features multiple equilibria.
In some equilibria, positive redistribution persists forever. In other equilibria, even
a majority of bene ciaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end
of the welfare state next period. Skill-biased technical change makes the survival of
the welfare state less likely. (JEL D72, E62, H11, H31, P16)
There is now a growing literature bringing
politico-economic aspects into macroeconom-
ics. Rather than treating policies as exogenous
instruments in the hands of benevolent policy
makers, this recent literature describes govern-
ment policies as endogenous outcomes collec-
tively determined by rational self-interested
individuals. While many important issues are
dynamic in nature, technical limitations have,
however, so far prevented a thorough investi-
gation of dynamic political choices in macro-
economics. This paper takes a step towards
overcoming these dif culties.
In particular, we construct a tractable positive
theory of the dynamics of income redistribution
where policy is set through repeated voting by
forward-looking rational agents, and current
policy affects future political outcomes through
changes in the distribution of voters. Until now,
the literature has resorted to numerical tech-
niques to study this link and our contribution is
therefore partly methodological. Equally impor-
tant, our theory provides insights on salient as-
pects of the debate on the determinants of
redistributive policies (the “welfare state”).
First, it predicts that welfare state policies and
their effects on distribution are persistent:
shocks to the income distribution that would
have transitory effects if policies were exoge-
nous may lead to permanent changes in the
demand for redistributive policies. These, in
turn, affect private investment behavior and the
future dynamics of income distribution. Second,
it suggests that welfare state institutions are
intrinsically fragile, since even political major-
ities bene ting from redistribution may want to
strategically vote for policies leading to the
dismantlement of the welfare state. The latter
prediction hinges, in our model, on rational
dynamic voting and would be absent if agents
voted myopically, ignoring the effect of current
political decisions on future political outcomes.
Thus, our theory provides an example of how
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forward-looking political behavior may qualita-
tively change the predictions of theory.
Our model is close in spirit to the canonical
politico-economic model of Allan H. Meltzer
and Scott F. Richard (1981), where agents vote
over redistribution  nanced by distortionary
taxes in a static setting. Our economy is popu-
lated by two-period lived agents who are ex ante
identical, but ex post heterogeneous. The over-
lapping generation structure is intended to cap-
ture the idea that, as life goes by, uncertainty
about lifetime income is resolved. While young
individuals are born identical, the old individu-
als have heterogeneous preferences for redistri-
bution, since the resolution of uncertainty has
turned some of them into high-income (“suc-
cessful”) individuals and others into low-income
(“unsuccessful”) individuals. A key assumption
is that young individuals can affect their chances
of becoming successful by making a private
(human-capital) investment when young. The
optimal investment is negatively affected by the
extent of current and future redistribution,
which is set period by period in political elec-
tions. Voters are fully rational, and take into
account the effects of policies on current invest-
ments and on the future distribution of voters.
The focus of the paper is the ex post con ict
over redistribution and if it can, on its own, lead
to the perpetual survival of the welfare state. To
this end, we assume that individuals are risk
neutral, abstracting from a standard alternative
motivation for the welfare state, i.e., that a gov-
ernment can deliver the insurance missing mar-
kets fail to provide. Our assumption of risk
neutrality and the fact that redistribution is dis-
tortionary, imply that any allocation with some
redistribution (after the  rst period) would not
be Pareto optimal. Thus, the welfare state would
not survive if the future path of redistribution
were set by a utilitarian planner attaching any
arbitrary sequence of positive weights on cur-
rent and future generations. In this sense, the
survival of a welfare state would constitute a
“political failure,” as de ned by Timothy Bes-
ley and Stephen Coate (1998). Similarly, there
would be no welfare state if young agents could
commit to vote in a particular way in the future.
However, as such commitments are not feasible
in democratic systems, ex post con icts in u-
ence political outcomes.
The theory has two main predictions. First,
the political mechanism can sustain the welfare
state. In particular, if the economy starts with a
pro-redistribution majority, high levels of redis-
tribution can be sustained over time, whereas
there will not be a welfare state if the economy
starts with an anti-redistribution majority. More-
over, if a one-time shock creates a temporary
political majority in favor of redistribution, the
model predicts that the support for the welfare
state can continue and regenerate a constituency
for such policies. This result is due to a self-
reinforcing mechanism linking private and col-
lective choices: high current redistribution
reduces investments, implying that a larger
share of future voters will bene t from redis-
tributive policies.1
Second, there exist equilibria where an exist-
ing welfare state is irreversibly terminated by
forward-looking voters, even when bene t re-
cipients are initially politically decisive. In
these equilibria, an initial pro-welfare state ma-
jority votes strategically for moderate redistri-
bution so as to induce a future anti-welfare state
majority. The expectation that the welfare state
will vanish strengthens the incentives of the
young to invest, thereby reducing the depen-
dency ratio and current taxes. Furthermore, in
an extension, we show that the breakdown of
the welfare state becomes more likely when the
pretax wage inequality is large, since such in-
equality strengthens the incentives for private
investment and reduces, ceteris paribus, the
constituency of the welfare state.
The  rst prediction of the theory, i.e., that
redistributive programs tend to be persistent, is
consistent with a number of empirical observa-
tions. For instance, a number of welfare state
institutions were introduced in the aftermath of
the Great Depression and after World War II,
when large masses of people were impover-
ished, thereby creating a demand for public
intervention.2 The size of government pro-
1 In related papers, Hassler et al. (1999, 2001a, 2002),
we explore other examples of this mechanism in settings
where unemployment interacts with the provision of unem-
ployment insurance. Other related contributions are Assar
Lindbeck (1995) and Lindbeck et al. (1999) who stress that
policy persistence may arise from gradual changes in social
norms vis-a`-vis recipients of social assistance when a large
mass of agents become dependent on such safety nets.
2 Between 1929 and 1934, government spending as a
fraction of GNP doubled in the United States as well as in
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grams, redistributional policies and public em-
ployment did not diminish after the economies
had recovered from the shocks. Instead, these
policies persisted and were further expanded in
the 1960’s. According to our theory, this per-
sistence stems from the fact that once they are in
place, redistributive programs, government em-
ployment, etc., affect private incentives in a
way generating a sustained demand for their
continuation. Our theory predicts that not only
policies, but also their effects on income distri-
bution, are persistent. Such joint persistence is
consistent with the dynamics of unemployment
and unemployment insurance in European coun-
tries after the oil shocks. The sharp increase in
unemployment after these shocks was followed
by increasing unemployment bene ts and larger
tax wedges, which contributed to sustaining
large unemployment and generating hysteresis.3
The second prediction of the theory is more
dif cult to assess empirically. It is, however,
broadly consistent with the observation that
conservative governments proposing drastic re-
ductions in social policies were elected and
reelected in the 1980’s in Anglo-Saxon countries,
in times associated with a signi cant increase in
wage inequality. This political development has
not been mirrored in continental European
countries, where changes in wage inequality
were less pronounced.
Our theory may contribute to the understand-
ing of various aspects of the dynamics of redis-
tribution, although several important elements
are missing in our highly stylized setting. In
reality, the political debate is multidimensional,
with different issues being salient in different
elections. Social groups have con icting inter-
ests on different aspects of the welfare state, and
governments have access to more sophisticated
policies than our simple rich-to-poor transfer
system. For instance, the accumulation of gov-
ernment debt is ruled out throughout the paper.
This is as an important limitation for under-
standing the intergenerational con ict. Finally,
we have, for simplicity, abstracted from risk
aversion, while fully acknowledging that the
insurance motive may be important for under-
standing the demand for redistribution. While
these are all important limitations, we believe
that our tractable framework can be enriched and
further developed to account for some of these and
other aspects of how distributional con icts are
resolved in a dynamic political context.4
There are a number of instances, both in the
economic literature and the policy debate,
where dynamic links between current and future
political choices and constituencies are of  rst-
order importance. For instance, in the debate
on the optimal speed of transition in post-
communist countries, a number of economists
have stressed that gradualism in reforms such as
restructuring and reorganizing labor markets,
privatizing  rms and liberalizing prices, may be
preferable to a “big bang” approach. The reason
is that the latter may give rise to majorities of
stakeholders with an interest in blocking or re-
verting the path of reform at some stage in the
process. In contrast, gradual reforms are argued
to allow “building constituencies for further re-
forms” by starting with easier reforms designed
to increase future support for more dif cult
reforms (see Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard
Roland, 1995).5 Dynamic voting aspects have
also been regarded as important in understand-
ing the transition to democracy. Daron Acemo-
glu and James A. Robinson (2000, 2001) argue
that the political elites extended franchise over
the nineteenth century in order to commit to
the major European countries, e.g., France and Italy. A
change of the same magnitude occurred in the United King-
dom in the 1930’s, although most of the expansion took
place after 1934.
3 Unemployment in OECD Europe rose from an average
of 2.4 percent during 1969–1973 to 8.0 percent during
1985–1989, while unemployment bene t replacement ratios
in OECD Europe rose from 18 percent to 30 percent for the
same time periods. (Source: OECD Economic Outlook and
OECD database on Bene t Entitlements and Gross Replace-
ment Ratios.)
4 Hassler et al. (2003), for instance, build on the setup of
this paper and consider the choice of redistribution in a
more elaborate political model with probabilistic voting and
risk-averse agents.
5 Gradual reforms are also argued to allow for divide-
and-rule tactics (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992a, b): if it is
too expensive to compensate a suf cient constituency of
workers today for the costs of massive layoffs, the govern-
ment could instead compensate a minority of workers today,
so that these will, together with those workers who eventu-
ally are retained, secure a constituence in favor of reform in
the next period. Philippe Aghion and Olivier J. Blanchard
(1994) argue that fast reforms would raise the demand for
social policies to compensate losers (e.g., unemployment
bene ts), and the  scal effects of these policies will slow
down the entry of new  rms in the reformed sectors.
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sustained redistributive policies in return for
less social unrest. Moreover, land reforms prior
to democratization were implemented in order
to reduce inequality, thereby ensuring that the
poor, once in power, would limit their future
demands for redistribution. Such restraints con-
solidated democracy by reducing the risk of the
rich mounting a coup.6
Several earlier papers have analyzed the po-
litical economy of redistribution, but earlier
models had to assume either myopic voting
behavior, as in Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik
(1994); or that current voters can commit to
future policies once and for all, as in RichardW.
Boadway and David E. Wildasin (1989) and
Giuseppe Bertola (1993); or,  nally, had to
limit the attention to environments with no stra-
tegic interaction between voters at different
dates, as in Roland Benabou (1996, 2000) and
Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (1994). In
contrast, our paper provides an analytical char-
acterization of Markov perfect equilibria with-
out commitment in a politico-economic model
where rational voters face a strategic voting
incentive.
To the best of our knowledge, the only pre-
vious paper that works out an analytical solution
to the Markov perfect equilibria of a dynamic
political economy model is Gene M. Grossman
and Elhanan Helpman (1998). They analyze the
political determination of intergenerational re-
distribution in a growth model with overlapping
generations, lobbies, and an AK technology. In
their model, however, agents make no private
economic decisions, and thus there is no feed-
back between public policy and individual be-
havior, a central mechanism in our analysis. The
equilibrium of their linear model features a
broad range of indeterminate political choices.
Other models have incorporated repeated voting
with strategic interactions, but only yielded nu-
merical solutions (e.g., Krusell and R‡´os-Rull,
1996, 1999; Krusell et al., 1996; Marco Bas-
setto, 1999; and Gilles Saint Paul, 2001). Saint
Paul (2001), in particular, numerically solves a
politico-economic model with dynamic voting,
where redistribution may fall after increases
in inequality if such inequality is concentrated
at the lower tail of the distribution, so that
the median voter becomes richer. Saint Paul’s
(2001) paper documents that this may be a
realistic description of the political changes that
occurred in Anglo-Saxon countries in the
1980’s, an episode that is also consistent with
our theory, as discussed above.
In our model, expectations of high future
redistribution leads to lower investments, which,
in turn, increase future demand for redistribu-
tion. Such a feedback mechanism is present in a
number of previous papers, including Gerhard
Glomm and B. Ravikumar (1995), Saint Paul
and Thierry Verdier (1997), and Benabou
(2000).7 In these papers, however, the median
voter has no stake in future political outcomes
and there is no motive for strategic voting. In
our model, in contrast, such motive is present
and plays a crucial role. In particular, old voters6 Strategic voting consideration are often concealed in
political debates, arguably for reasons of political correct-
ness. In some cases, however, they have been made explicit.
In the debate on the European Monetary Union, for exam-
ple, Euro-sceptics have argued that a monetary union is
intended as a stepping stone towards a more politically
integrated federal Europe (see, for instance, Lord Skidel-
sky’s speech in the British House of Lords, January 20,
1999; or, on the opposite side, Romano Prodi’s speech to
the European Parliament, April 13, 1999). Among the neg-
ative effects, critics see the consolidation of a European
bureaucracy that will lobby for further centralization of
power in the future.
Another example is the recent debate in Israel on a
Knesset bill (passed in November 2000) increasing the
generosity of child allowances to families with  ve or more
children. Some opponents have argued that such policies
would destabilize the demographic equilibrium in the Israeli
society, by disproportionally increasing the future political
in uence of groups—e.g., the ultra-orthodox or the Arab—
whose fertility decisions are argued to be more responsive
to such incentives.
7 Saint Paul and Verdier (1997) show that multiple equi-
libria can arise in a politico-economic model where agents
vote over capital taxation and have access to opportunities
of expatriating their savings at costs varying exogenously
across individuals. The expectation of the level of future
taxation of domestic savings determines the extent to which
young individuals exploit these opportunities. Under the
assumption that the median voter has better than average
access to international capital markets, multiple equilibria
may arise. In Glomm and Ravikumar (1995), the endoge-
nous determination of public expenditure creates multiple
equilibria in a model where voters are identical. In their
model, expectations of high (low) taxes reduce (increase)
private educational investments and future income. Under
the assumption that taxes are used to  nance an inferior
public good, high (low) income implies that the homoge-
neous voters prefer low (high) public good provision and
taxes, leading to the possibility of multiple equilibria.
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face an incentive to strategically moderate their
demand for current redistribution so as to in-
duce the expectation of a future majority against
redistribution, which would lead to lower cur-
rent taxes. If voters myopically ignored the ef-
fect of their political choice on the future
distribution of voters, there would be a unique
equilibrium where an initial majority of unsuc-
cessful voters sustains the welfare state forever.
While in our paper redistribution has no in-
trinsic value, there is a large literature arguing
that redistribution ameliorates capital market
imperfections. In Benabou (2000), for instance,
the political support for redistribution is high
when the ef ciency-enhancing effect dominates
the purely redistributive one. This occurs when
inequality is suf ciently small and thus, on the
one hand, low inequality induces high redistri-
bution. On the other hand, high redistribution
sustains low inequality and hence, multiple
steady states are possible. Thus, his paper is
consistent with the observation that inequality
and redistribution are negatively correlated
across developed countries.8
Among other related papers, Stephen Coate
and Stephen Morris (1999) construct a model of
special interest groups where  rms choose their
location on the basis of geographical subsidies
and have, ex post (though not ex ante), an in-
centive to bribe politicians for the subsidies to
be continued. Their model features multiple
steady states and policy persistence, but the
political mechanism is very different from ours.
In Thomas Piketty (1995), social learning about
the trade-off between ef ciency and incentives
gives rise to multiple steady states with different
levels of redistribution. Finally, a series of pa-
pers provide positive theories of social security
in repeated voting models (Jose I. Conde Ruiz
and Vincenzo Galasso, 1999; Thomas F. Cooley
and Jorge Soares, 1999; Michele Boldrin and
Aldo Rustichini, 2000). In these papers, inter-
generational redistribution is sustained by trig-
ger strategies in in nite horizon games. In
contrast, our results would survive in an envi-
ronment with a  nite horizon.
The plan of the paper is the following. Sec-
tion I describes the model. Section II character-
izes the political equilibria, and Section III
explores the implications of rising wage premia.
Section IV concludes. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
I. The Model
The model economy consists of a continuum
of risk-neutral, two-period lived agents. Each
generation has a unit mass. All agents are born
identical, but their subsequent earnings are sto-
chastic. “Successful” agents earn a high wage,
normalized to unity, in both periods of their life,
whereas “unsuccessful” agents earn a low wage,
normalized to zero. At birth, each agent under-
takes a costly investment, thereby increasing the
probability of subsequent success. The cost of
investment, which can be interpreted as the dis-
utility of educational effort, is e2, where e is the
probability of success.9
The dynamics of redistribution from successful
to unsuccessful agents is the focal point of the
paper. In each period, a transfer b [ [0, 1] to each
low-income agent is determined,  nanced by col-
lecting a lump-sum tax t.10 The transfer, and the
associated tax rate, are determined before the
young agents decide on their investment, and is
assumed to be age-independent.We shall, how-
ever, maintain that the government budget bal-
ances in every period.
The expected utility of agents alive at time t
is given as follows:
8 Politico-economic models a la Meltzer and Richard
(1981) typically predict that higher inequality increases the
demand for redistribution. In our two-group setup, however,
the median voter can be richer than the average voter, and
the predictions of our theory about the sign of the correla-
tion between inequality and redistribution is ambiguous. For
instance, the equilibrium features zero redistribution if in-
equality is large and the median voter is richer than average,
whereas it features positive redistribution if inequality is
very low and the median voter is poorer than the average.
9 It is important for the analysis that agents earn income
in both periods. The assumption that  rst and second period
income are perfectly correlated is, however, not essential—
the qualitative results will be preserved provided that earn-
ings in the two periods are positively correlated.
10 The assumption that b # 1 can be motivated by
incentive considerations. If redistribution were larger than
100 percent, successful agents would decide not to work and
to claim bene ts. The assumption that b $ 0 is a useful
benchmark, and it can be regarded as the effect of some
constitutional principle that public redistribution cannot be
regressive. An important consequence of the restrictions on
b is that optimal effort is bounded between zero and one and
therefore can be interpreted as a probability.
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(1) V˜ os~b t , b t1 1 , t t ! 5 1 2 t t
V˜ou~b t , b t1 1 , t t ! 5 b t 2 t t
V˜y~et , bt , bt1 1 , tt , tt1 1!5 et~11 b!1 ~12 et!
3 ~bt 1 bb t1 1 !
2 e t
2 2 t t2 btt1 1 ,
where V˜os, V˜ou, and V˜y denote the objective of
old successful, old unsuccessful, and young
agents, respectively. V˜y is computed prior to
individual success or failure and b [ [0, 1] is
the discount factor. It is straightforward to show
that the solution to the optimal investment prob-
lem of the young, given bt and bt1 1, is
e*t 5 e*(bt, bt1 1) 5 (1 1 b 2 (bt 1 bbt11))/2.
Since agents are ex ante identical, agents of
the same cohort choose the same investment,
which implies that the proportion of old unsuc-
cessful in period t 1 1 is given by
(2) u t1 1 5 1 2 e*t 5
1
2
~1 2 b 1 b t 1 bb t1 1 !.
Thus, the future proportion of old unsuccessful
depends on bene ts in period t and t 1 1. To
balance the budget, tax revenues must amount
to 2tt 5 (ut 1 ut1 1)bt, yielding
(3) t t 5
1
4
~1 2 b 1 b t 1 bb t1 1 1 2u t !b t .
By substituting for tt and e*t in equation (1),
the indirect utility functions can be written as:
(4) Vos~bt , bt1 1 , ut!5 12
1
4
~~12 b!
1 ~bt 1 bbt1 1 ! 1 2u t )b t
Vou~bt , bt1 1 , ut!5 bt2
1
4
~~12 b!
1 ~bt 1 bbt1 1 ! 1 2u t )b t
Vy~bt , bt1 1 , bt1 2 , ut!5
1
4
~~11 b!21 ~~12 b!
2 2u t )b t2 ~b t1 1
1 bb t1 2 )bb t1 1).
Note that taxes per unit of bene ts, tt/bt 5
(1 2 b 1 bt 1 bbt1 1 1 2ut)/4, increase in
ut (because higher ut implies a higher depen-
dency ratio among the old) and in bt and bt1 1
(because higher bt and bt1 1 reduce investment,
implying a higher dependency ratio among the
young). Since the old in period t cannot enjoy
bene ts in period t 1 1, their utility is decreas-
ing in bt1 1.
The old successful agents obviously prefer
zero bene ts, since redistribution implies posi-
tive taxes without providing any bene ts. In
contrast, the old unsuccessful agents are better
off with some redistribution, even though their
preferences for redistributionmay be nonmono-
tonic, as the marginal cost of redistribution is
increasing in bt. Concerning the preferences of
the young, note that positive bene ts lead to
positive (negative) intergenerational redistribu-
tion from the old to the young, if the number of
old unsuccessful is suf ciently small (large).
Holding future bene ts constant, the young pre-
fer positive redistribution if and only if ut ,
(1 2 b)/ 2.
Before proceeding to the main analysis, we
note that any Pareto-ef cient allocation is char-
acterized by zero redistribution in every period
except, possibly, in the  rst.11The reason is that
redistribution distorts the effort choice of the
young, but has no insurance value as agents are
risk neutral.
11More formally, we de ne the class of Pareto-optimal
sequences of bene ts, {b t}t5 1
` , as those which would be
chosen by a social planner whose objective function is given
by
max
$bt% t 5 1
`
5 l0s~1 2 u1 !Vos~b1 , b2 , u1 !
1 l0uu1V
ou~b1 , b2 , u1 !
1 O
t5 1
`
ltV
y~bt , bt1 1 , bt1 2 , u t !6 ,
subject to bt [ [0, 1] @t, where the planner weights l0s,
l0u, and {lt}t50
` are strictly positive. It is straightforward
to show that the planner would choose zero bene ts after the
 rst period, for any arbitrary sequence of (positive) planner
weights. Moreover, a utilitarian planner with equal weights
on all initially living individuals would set b0 5 0, for any
u0. The proof is available upon request.
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II. Political Equilibrium
The purpose of this paper is to explore the
impact of the ex post con ict of interest between
groups on the dynamics of redistribution. More
speci cally, can an “inef cient” welfare state
survive over time? Or will dynamic voting de-
cisions make redistribution vanish in the long
run?
In answering this question, we restrict the
attention to Markov perfect equilibria, where
the state of the economy is summarized by the
proportion of current unsuccessful old agents
(ut). The political equilibrium is de ned as
follows.
De nition 1: A (Markov perfect) political equi-
librium is de ned as a pair of functions B, U ,
where B: [0, 1] # [0, 1] is a public policy
rule, bt 5 B(ut), and U: [0, 1] # [0, 1] is a
private decision rule, ut1 1 5 1 2 e*t 5 U(bt),
such that the following functional equations
hold:
1. B(ut) 5 arg maxbt V(bt, bt1 1, bt1 2, ut)
subject to bt1 1 5 B(U(bt)), bt1 2 5
B(U(B(U(bt)))) , and bt [ [0, 1], and V(bt,
bt1 1, bt1 2, ut) is de ned as the indirect
utility of the current decisive voter.
2. U(bt) 5 (1 2 b 1 bt 1 bbt1 1)/ 2, with
bt1 1 5 B(U(bt)).
The  rst equilibrium condition requires that
bt maximizes the objective function of the de-
cisive (median) voter V, taking into account that
future redistribution depends on the current pol-
icy choice via the equilibrium private decision
rule and future equilibrium public policy rules.
Furthermore, it requires B(ut) to be a  xed
point in the functional equation in part 1 of the
de nition. In other words, suppose that agents
believe future bene ts to be set according to the
function bt1 j 5 B(ut1 j). Then, we require that
the same function B(ut) de nes optimal bene ts
today.
The second equilibrium condition implies
that all young individuals choose their invest-
ment optimally, given bt and bt1 1, and that
agents hold rational expectations about future
bene ts and distributionsof types. In general, U
might be a function of both ut and bt. In our
model, however, ut has neither a direct effect on
the investment choice of the young, nor, conse-
quently, on the future distribution of voters.
Thus, we choose to focus on equilibria where
their equilibrium investment choice is fully de-
termined by the current bene t level.
Finally, in order to single out the effects of
dynamic rational voting, it is useful to de ne an
alternative myopic voting equilibrium, where
voters ignore the impact on future political de-
cisions when deciding on current policies. A
myopic equilibrium is de ned as in De nition
1, but with condition 1 being replaced by
19. B(ut) 5 arg maxbt V(bt, b
#
t11, b#t12, ut) sub-
ject to bt [ [0, 1], where b#t11 and b#t1 2
are taken as parametric, subject to rational
expectations.
This condition requires that bt maximizes the
objective function of the decisive (median)
voter V, taking future redistribution as given.
Voters correctly anticipate future redistribution,
but ignore that they could affect its path through
their current political choice. In the rest of the
analysis, we refer to a Markov perfect equilib-
rium as an equilibrium, and state explicitly
when referring to a myopic voting equilibrium.
A. Dictatorship
For expositional reasons it is convenient to
start the analysis by describing the equilibrium
under the assumption that the political power
permanently rests in the hands of one of the two
groups of old agents in the society. Then, we
extend the analysis to the case of majority
voting.
We de ne “plutocracy” (PL) and “dictator-
ship of the proletariat” (DP) as the regimes
where the level of redistribution is chosen at the
beginning of each period by the currently living
successful and unsuccessful old agents, respec-
tively. Formally, under DP, V(bt, bt1 1, bt1 2,
ut) [ V
ou(bt, bt1 1, ut) whereas, under PL,
V(bt, bt1 1, bt1 2, ut) [ V
os(bt, bt1 1, ut). The
equilibrium under dictatorship is characterized
in the following proposition.12
12 The gist of the derivation of the equilibrium functions
is the following. Start by assuming B to be linear in ut,
ignoring the constraint that b [ [0, 1]. Then, as the young
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PROPOSITION 1: The PL equilibrium, Bpl,
Upl , is characterized as follows:
(5) Bpl~u t ! 5 0
Upl~b t ! 5
1
2
~1 2 b 1 b t !.
Given u0 [ [0, 1], for all t $ 1, ut 5
upl ;
1 2 b
2
.
The DP equilibrium, Bdp, Udp , is charac-
terized as follows:
(6) Bdp~ut!5
3
2
2 ut
if u t . u# ~b!;
bdp2
2
2 2 b
~ut 2 u
dp!
if u t [
3
2
2
2
2 1 b
, u# ~b! ;
1
if u t [ 0,
3
2
2
2
2 1 b
;
(7) Udp~bt!5
udp1
22 b
4
~bt2 b
dp!
if b t [
2b
2 1 b
, 1 ;
1
2
~1 1 b t !
if bt [ 0,
2b
2 1 bD ,
where udp ;
1
6 X 5 1 b
2
2 1 bD , bdp ; 43 1 1 b2 1 b
and u# ~b! 5
b 1 6 2 b 4 2 2b
2~2 1 b!
. The equi-
librium law of motion, ut1 15 U
dp(Bdp(ut)) , is
as follows:
(8) u t1 1 5
5
4
2
u t
2
if u t. u# ~b!;
udp2
1
2
~u t 2 u
dp!
if u t [
3
2
2
2
~2 1 b!
, u# ~b! ;
b
4
1
2
2 1 b
if u t [ 0,
3
2
2
2
~2 1 b!
.
Given u0 [ [0, 1], the economy converges with
an oscillatory pattern to a unique steady state,
u 5 udp and b 5 bdp.
Figure 1 represents the equilibrium public
policy rule and private decision rule for the PL
and DP equilibrium, for a case in which the
range ut . u# (b) is empty, i.e., u# (b) $ 1.
13 In
the PL case (upper  gures), the policy function
is constant at Bpl(ut) 5 0, and the private
decision rule is upward sloping, re ecting the
expectationsof the young agents that bt1 15 0,
are risk neutral with quadratic effort costs, the function U,
satisfying condition 2 in equilibrium De nition 1, is linear
in b t. Moreover, the indirect utility is also linear quadratic
in bt, once B and U have been substituted into (4). It turns
out that, in the absence of constraints, the optimal choice of
b t is indeed linear in ut. Imposing condition 1 in equilibrium
De nition 1, it is straightforward to solve for the coef -
cients in B . What remains is to impose the constraints on
b t, and check that no deviations from this constrained
linear rule can be optimal. Such deviations may, in some
cases, be optimal, as, e.g., explained in footnote 13, in
which case the policy rule B must be modi ed in a
nontrivial way.
13All  gures, including Figure 1, represent a parametric
case where b 5 0.75. Note that b , (=17 2 1)/4 ’ 0.78
implies that u# (b) . 1. If, in contrast, u˜(b) , 1, there is a
range ut [ [u# , 1] such that the unsuccessful old in period
t induce a ut1 1 where the constraint b t1 1 # 1 is binding.
This creates a downward discontinuity of B(u t) at u# . The
range [u# , 1] is ephemeral, in the sense that in equilibrium,
u t , u# @t . 0. Therefore, if the economy starts at u0 , u# ,
the policy rule and law of motion are qualitatively identical
to those in Figure 1. Otherwise, they differ for one period
only. To understand the origin of the downward disconti-
nuity, note that bt1 1 is negatively related to bt when the
constraint bt1 1 # 1 is not binding. Thus, the marginal
distortion of current bene ts shifts upward at u# , as the
constraint on b t1 1 becomes binding. Therefore, B(ut) falls
discontinuously at u t 5 u# .
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irrespective of the choice of bt. In the DP case
(lower  gures), the equilibrium redistribution is
always strictly positive, and it is 100 percent for
suf ciently low ut. Furthermore, it is downward
sloping, re ecting the fact that the marginal cost
of redistribution increases, as the current pro-
portion of old successful agents falls [see equa-
tion (3)]. The private decision rule is also
positively sloped, but less steep than in the PL
case, since an increase in bt negatively affects the
choice of bt11, hence, the current effort choice of
the young responds less to an increase in current
bene ts than if future redistributionwere constant.
B. Majority Voting
We now assume that political decisions are
taken through majority voting. Agents vote on
the single issue of redistribution. It is straight-
forward to show that if young agents were piv-
otal in voting over current bene ts, then, for all
t . 0, bene ts would be zero in equilibrium.
Intuitively, as the young are still behind the
veil of ignorance, they oppose distortionary
redistribution.
However, we regard it as unrealistic to as-
sume that voters behind the veil of ignorance
are pivotal.14 Thus, this paper explores the con-
sequences of letting the political decisions be
determined by the ex post con ict of interests
between individuals who know their type, i.e.,
14 For instance, in a model where agents live for more
than two periods and make their investment decision in the
 rst period only, the “young” would constitute a small
proportion of the electorate and are not likely to be decisive.
FIGURE 1. PUBLIC POLICY RULE AND PRIVATE DECISION RULE UNDER PLUTOCRACY (UPPER PANELS)
AND DICTATORSHIP OF PROLETARIAT (LOWER PANELS)
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the old. Two alternative assumptions can de-
liver a political preponderance of the old in our
model. The  rst is to assume that young indi-
viduals have a lower voting turnout than the old,
maintaining that current bene ts are set at the
beginning of each period. This assumption can
be defended empirically as the voting turnout
increases with age. For example, Raymond E.
Wol nger and Steven J. Rosenstone (1980)
document that turnout in U.S. elections is
sharply increasing in age, rising from 45 percent
for the 20-year-old to 75 percent for the 65-
year-old.15 Alternatively, it might be assumed
that elections were held at the end of each
period, and agents voted over bene ts in the
next period, after the uncertainty about their
individual success had been unraveled. In this
case, by not being alive in the next period, the
old would have no interests at stake and could
be assumed to abstain from voting. Clearly, this
is equivalent to assuming that the choice of
current bene ts is taken at the beginning of each
period, but only the old vote. For expositional
ease, we maintain in the presentation the inter-
pretation that agents vote over current bene ts
and only the old vote.16
Bene ts are chosen to maximize the indirect
utility of the old successful (unsuccessful) if
ut # 1 2 (ut . 1 2 ). As we shall see, majority
voting can generate persistence in the equilib-
rium choice of redistribution. If the economy
starts with a pro-welfare state majority (ut .
1 2 ), then there exists an equilibrium where the
welfare state and the political majority support-
ing it is sustained over time. Conversely, if ut#
1 2 , the welfare state will never arise. The pos-
itive feedback mechanism giving rise to the
persistence of policies and distributions of vot-
ers is that high (low) bene ts today affect pri-
vate incentives so as to induce a large (small)
proportion of unsuccessful agents tomorrow,
and therefore a broad (narrow) future constitu-
ency for redistribution.
An initial majority of unsuccessful individu-
als does not guarantee, however, the eternal
survival of the welfare state. For suf ciently
high discount factors, and given an initial ma-
jority of unsuccessful individuals, there exist, in
addition, equilibria where any existing welfare
state is dismantled in, at most, two periods. The
survival of the welfare state is in this case a
matter of self-ful lling expectations.
As we shall see, expectations (beliefs) about
the identity of the future median voter play a
crucial role in driving such multiplicity. If the
agents expect that a majority of successful
agents will materialize in the next period, that
majority is then expected to implement zero
redistribution. Conversely, if they expect a ma-
jority of unsuccessful agents in the next period,
they expect next period redistribution to be
strictly positive. We assume that in the case of
a tie, bene ts are chosen by the successful
agents. Before characterizing equilibria, it is
useful to discuss some general properties of the
expectations. According to De nition 1, expec-
tations must be rational, which imposes two
restrictions. First, it would be irrational to be-
lieve that the old successful will be in majority
next period if, in the current period, voters set
bt . b, since the private decision rule would
then imply that ut1 1 5 (1 2 b 1 bt 1
bbt1 1)/ 2 . 1 2 . Second, it would be irrational
to believe that a majority of unsuccessful in-
dividuals will materialize in the next period if
the current majority sets bt 5 0, since, then,
ut1 1 5 (1 2 b 1 bbt1 1)/ 2 # 1 2 . We as-
sume in addition, that expectations about the
identity of the median voter are “monotonic”: if
agents believe that bt 5 x induces ut1 1 # 1 2 ,
then they must also believe that bt , x induces
ut1 1 # 1 2 .
17
15 Furthermore, Casey B. Mulligan and Xavier Sala-i-
Martin (1999) construct a model where the elderly have a
preponderant in uence on the determination of redistribu-
tion policies. In their paper, this arises due to the old having
a low opportunity cost of time.
16 In a previous version of this paper, Hassler et al.
(2001b), we also analyzed an intermediate case, when the
young vote before knowing their type, albeit with a lower
turnout than the old, in elections held at the beginning of
each period. In particular, only a share « [ [0, 1] of the
young individuals was assumed to participate in the voting
process. The key insight of that extension is that our results
when only the old vote (« 5 0) remain unchanged for « .
0, provided that « is not too large.
17 The assumption of “monotonicity” plays no role in the
characterization of the equilibrium path, since, as we shall
see, the only essential feature of beliefs is the highest level
of b inducing a majority of successful individuals. How-
ever, the assumption simpli es the characterization of
out-of-equilibrium behavior and reduces the set of observa-
tionally equivalent equilibria.
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Given these assumptions, we can summarize
beliefs about the identity of the future median
voter as a threshold bene t level, denoted by u [
[0,b], such that all agents expect that zero bene ts
will be provided at t 1 1, if and only if current
redistribution is smaller or equal to u. Formally, if
and only if bt# u, the equilibriumprivate decision
rule and policy function must feature, respec-
tively,U(bt)# 12 and B(U(bt))5 0.
18 Finally, we
assume that u is constant over time and the same
for all agents.
In the rest of this section, we will prove that,
conditional on the existence of an initial majority
of old unsuccessful agents, equilibria featuring
the survival of the welfare state (“pro-welfare
equilibria”) are sustained if the welfare state is
believed to be suf ciently robust, i.e., for suf-
 ciently low u. Instead, equilibria where the
ruling old unsuccessful vote strategically so as
to induce a future political majority of success-
ful agents that will vote for zero redistribution
(“anti-welfare equilibria”) are sustained if the
welfare state is believed to be suf ciently “frag-
ile,” i.e., for suf ciently high u. In both cases,
the beliefs that determine private investments
and political choices are ful lled in equilibrium.
1. Pro-Welfare Equilibria.—In this part, we
consider pro-welfare equilibria. These equilib-
ria feature multiple steady states: if the initial
median voter is unsuccessful, the welfare state
survives forever. If, instead, the initial median
voter is successful, no welfare state will ever
arise. Recall that insofar that this equilibrium
determines an allocation with positive redistri-
bution after the  rst period, its outcome is not
Pareto optimal.
Essentially, the equilibrium functions Bpw
and Upw are found by splicing together the
equivalent functions from the equilibrium under
dictatorship in Proposition 1 (i.e., Bpl and Bdp,
and Upl and Udp), and specifying beliefs (u)
such that no switch of political majority ever
occurs along the equilibrium path.
PROPOSITION 2: For all b [ [0, 1] and u #
u#(b) [ (0, b], there exists a “pro-welfare equi-
librium” (PWE), Bpw, Upw , featuring multiple
steady states, with the following characteristics:
(9) Bpw~u t ! 5
Bdp~u t ! . 0 if u t [ ~
1
2
, 1#
Bpl~u t ! 5 0 if u t [ @0,
1
2
#
(10) Upw~b t ! 5
Udp~b t ! .
1
2
if b t [ ~u, 1#
Upl~b t ! #
1
2
if b t [ @0, u#,
where the expression of u# (b) is in the proof in
the Appendix, and Bdp(ut), B
pl(ut), U
dp(bt)
and Upl(bt) are de ned in Proposition 1.
The equilibrium law of motion, ut11 5 U
pw
(Bpw(ut)), implies that there are two locally
stable steady states;
1. if u0 # 0.5, the economy converges in one
period to a steady-state equilibrium with {b,
u} 5 {bpl, upl} as de ned in Proposition 1.
2. if 0.5 , u0 # 1, the economy converges
asymptotically with an oscillatory pattern to
an equilibrium with {b, u} 5 {bdp, udp} as
de ned in Proposition 1.
Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium policy rule
and private decision rule [for, again, b 5 0.75,
implying u# (b) . 1]. The left-hand panel shows
that, when ut # 1 2 , then B(ut) 5 0 in equi-
librium. At ut 5 1 2 , the policy function in-
creases discontinuously, as the unsuccessful
become pivotal. In fact, for an intermediate
range of ut, the equilibrium policy function pre-
scribes 100-percent redistribution, being down-
ward sloping thereafter. The right-hand panel
depicts the private decision rule. A majority of
old unsuccessful materializes at t 1 1 if and
only if bt . u. Since a majority of unsuccessful
at t 1 1 would set bt1 1 . 0, whereas a
majority of old successful would set bt1 1 5 0,
the private decision rule exhibits an upward
discontinuity at u.
This discontinuity implies a discrete increase
in the current tax level at bt 5 u. Thus, the
utility of the old unsuccessful is discontinuous
at u. The left-hand side of Figure 3 illustrates
this point, by plotting the utility of the old
unsuccessful as a function of b, given u and b
18 To simplify the notation, they will not be speci ed as
arguments of the equilibrium functions B, U . In particu-
lar, with some abuse of notation, we will write B(ut) and
U(bt) rather than B(ut; u ) and U(bt; u ).
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(the  gure depicts b 5 0.75 and ut 5 u
dp) and
for suf ciently low u, as in Proposition 2. For-
mally, the discontinuity is due to bt1 1 entering
negatively in the utility of the old in equation
(4). As a result, the preferences of the median
voter are not single-peaked with respect to bt.
The old unsuccessful face the temptation to vote
strategically for bt 5 u, so as to change the
identity of the future median voter, thereby en-
suring that the welfare state disappears. A PWE
is sustained if, as in the left-hand  gure, this
strategic voting option is not globally optimal,
i.e., the peak in preferences corresponding to
Bdp(u) yields higher utility than that corre-
sponding to u. This condition must hold for all
u [ (0.5, 1]. Note the role of the threshold u.
The lower is u, the higher the cost in terms of
forgone pretax earnings (bt) required to induce
the breakdown of the welfare state at t 1 1.
Intuitively, a low u means that agents regard the
welfare state as “robust,” and think that only
very low current redistribution can induce its
termination.
To further grasp the intuition, it is useful to
focus on the extreme belief, u 5 0. In this case,
the welfare state is expected to break down only
if current redistribution is set equal to zero. But
this cannot occur in equilibrium, since this
FIGURE 2. PUBLIC POLICY RULE AND PRIVATE DECISION RULE UNDER MAJORITY VOTING:
PRO-WELFARE EQUILIBRIUM (b 5 0.75)
FIGURE 3. INDIRECT UTILITY OF THE OLD UNSUCCESSFUL, Vou 5 Vou(bt, B(U(bt)), ut) UNDER PWE AND AWE
(b 5 0.75 AND ut 5 u
dp)
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would imply zero net earnings for the old un-
successful. This explains why, for any b, there
exist beliefs (i.e., a range of suf ciently low u)
sustaining the survival of the welfare state.
Proposition 2 implies that both redistributive
policies (b) and their effect on voters’ distribu-
tion (u) tend to be persistent. An existing wel-
fare state can in fact regenerate its political
support and survive in the long run. However,
without an initial majority in favor of redistri-
bution, the welfare state would never arise. It is
possible to account for the creation (as opposed
to survival) of the welfare state by introducing
in the model aggregate shocks affecting the
mapping from the individual educational effort
choice to the aggregate proportion of unsuccess-
ful. For instance, we have seen that a majority
of successful would tend to regenerate itself,
since the absence of a welfare state induces high
investments. Nevertheless, a suf ciently nega-
tive shock would imply a change of majority,
from successful to unsuccessful. The Great De-
pression can be interpreted as a once-and-for-all
shock that impoverished a suf ciently large
share of the voters so as to increase the political
support to redistributive programs. Then, the
mechanism described by Proposition 2 would
explain the persistence of such programs.19
To conclude the discussion of pro-welfare
equilibria, we examine the role of rational vot-
ing. If agents voted myopically, according to
our de nition in Section II, there would, for all
b, exist an equilibrium qualitatively similar to
the PWE of Figure 2. It would exhibit multiple
steady states and, if u0 . 0.5, bt and ut would
converge with an oscillatory pattern to a steady
state with positive redistribution. This steady
state would, however, feature less redistribution
and a lower proportion of unsuccessful in steady
state than under rational voting. The perceived
increase in current taxes due to an increase in
current redistribution, is smaller for rational
voters than for myopic voters. This is so be-
cause rational voters understand that, by in-
creasing current redistribution, they increase the
proportion of unsuccessful agents next period.
This implies a lower demand for redistribution
in the next period [recall that the policy function
B(u) is, in the relevant range, downward slop-
ing, so that bt1 1 falls when ut1 1 increases],
which lowers the number of young bene ciaries
and, therefore, current taxes. Myopic voters ig-
nore this effect and are therefore less prone to
choose high redistribution. In this sense, the ra-
tional voters use current redistribution strategi-
cally so as to manipulate future redistribution.20
2. Anti-Welfare Equilibria.—So far, we have
analyzed equilibria where an existing welfare
state survives. In this section, we show that for
b suf ciently large there exist other rational
expectationsequilibria with beliefs such that the
welfare state breaks down in  nite time (i.e., in
one or two periods). In such equilibria, the old
unsuccessful vote strategically so as to change
the identity of the future median voter, thereby
ensuring that the welfare state disappears. We
will also show that, as long as b, 1, no myopic
voting equilibrium featuring the breakdown of an
existing welfare state exists. Thus, the results of
this section hinge on rational forward-looking
voting.
These equilibria are labeled “anti-welfare
equilibria” (AWE). Their exact characteriza-
tion, including a complete set of conditions for
their existence, is provided in Proposition 3,
deferred to the Appendix. We summarize here
the main  ndings. There are two types of equi-
libria, depending on the discount factor, b, and
beliefs, u. In one type, the welfare state is ter-
minated in one period, whereas in the other it
may be terminated in either one or two periods.
We now discuss these two cases separately.
19 In an extension available upon request we introduce
stochastic shocks by assuming that, with a positive proba-
bility, p, the return to investment is as in the benchmark
model, implying that ut1 1 5 1 2 et, whereas, with prob-
ability 1 2 p, the probability of individual success in period
t [individually and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across
agents] is drawn from a probability density function (p.d.f.)
with support on the unit interval and mean 12 . Thus, with
probability 1 2 p the investment in education has no effect
on the probability of success of agents. Whether or not
effort matters is revealed after bene ts are set and effort is
chosen. The main result of this extension is that an existing
pro-welfare or anti-welfare majority regenerates itself with
probability (1 1 p)/ 2, whereas a change of majority occurs
with probability (1 2 p)/ 2. While pro- and anti-welfare
majorities are occasionally reverted, the mechanism that we
highlight in this section continues to apply.
20Under myopic voting, the steady-state redistribution is
equal to 2(1 1 b)/(3 1 2b) , bdp. The formal charac-
terization of the myoping voting equilibrium has been omit-
ted and is available upon request.
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The two upper panels in Figure 4 illustrate
equilibria with a breakdown of the welfare state
in one period. These equilibria require high
discount factors and suf ciently large u. In this
case, the welfare state is terminated in one pe-
riod, and the equilibrium policy rule and private
decision rule are as follows (see also part 1 of
Proposition 3 in the Appendix):
(11)
B aw~u t ! 5
u if u t.
1
2
0 if u t [ @0,
1
2
#
(12)
Uaw~b t ! 5 5 12 ~1 2 b 1 bu 1 b t ! if b t. u
Upl~bt ! else,
where Upl(bt) is de ned in Proposition 1. Note
that, if ut # 1 2 , the AWE policy function is as
in a PWE. If ut . 1 2 , however, the policy
function prescribes bt 5 u, i.e., bene ts are set
equal to the highest level that can induce
ut1 1 # 1 2 . Accordingly, the private decision
rule is discontinuousat u. As Figure 4 shows, if,
at time zero, the old unsuccessful are in major-
ity, then, given the policy function and beliefs,
FIGURE 4. PUBLIC POLICY RULE AND PRIVATE DECISION RULE UNDER MAJORITY VOTING:
ANTI-WELFARE EQUILIBRIUM WITH SWITCH IN ONE PERIOD (UPPER PANELS, u 5 0.75)
AND WITH SWITCH IN TWO PERIODS (LOWER PANELS, u 5 0.58)
(b 5 0.75)
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they  nd it optimal to set b0 5 u and induce
the switch of majority. The unsuccessful in ma-
jority at time one, then, choose b1 5 0 and
terminate the welfare state. The sequence of
equilibrium redistribution is, therefore, b0 5 u,
and bt 5 0, @t . 0.
21 The expectation of zero
future redistribution induces the young to exert
high investment, which in turn leads to a low
dependency ratio, granting low taxes in the  rst
period.
The right-hand side of Figure 3 represents the
utility of the old unsuccessful as a function of b,
given the same values of u and b as in the
left-hand-side panel, but for different beliefs, so
as to be consistent with equations (11)–(12). In
particular, u is larger, implying that agents re-
gard the welfare state as more “fragile” and
believe that a switch of majority will occur for
a larger range of current redistribution policies,
b. As before, the effort choice of the young falls
discontinuously at b 5 u. But, here, the global
maximum occurs at b 5 u. The AWE with
switch in one period is sustained if bt5 u is the
global maximum for all ut [ [0.5, 1]. Namely,
given the private decision rule, Uaw(b), any
majority of old unsuccessful will  nd it optimal
to induce the breakdown of the welfare state.
The belief that the welfare state is “fragile”
(high u) is crucial in making it attractive for the
old unsuccessful to induce the breakdown.
An interesting observation is that, given pa-
rameters, AWE with switch in one period Pareto-
dominate PWE, at least for economies starting
at the steady state of a PWE, u0 5 u
dp.22 Any
coordination device inducing the young to be-
lieve that the welfare state is suf ciently fragile
would improve the welfare of all agents in the
society, including the ex ante utility of all future
generations. This result can be related to the
debate on so-called “ scal increasing returns.”
It has been argued (e.g., Blanchard and Lawrence
H. Summers, 1987) that labor market reforms
such as reductions in the bargaining strength of
insiders, or lower replacement ratios, may lead,
in high unemployment economies, to ef ciency
gains that are so large that even the groups that
suffer a reduction in their pretax earnings would
bene t from the reforms in after-tax terms. In
other words, economies may get stuck in bad
equilibria along the declining side of the Laffer
curve. In our model, equilibria with inef ciently
high taxes are the outcome of expectational
traps: under pro-welfare expectations, a system
of inef cient redistribution is believed to be very
robust, and private and public decisions rein-
force each other in sustaining a Pareto-inferior
outcome. Changes in expectations (u) may lead
the society to a superior outcome.
It is important to emphasize two effects driv-
ing this result. First, current bene ts have a
direct impact on the government budget that
includes a static distortionary effect [tt is in-
creasing and convex in bt, see equation (3)].
However, in our model, this standard effect
would not be suf cient to induce the median
21 Thus, this equilibrium is Pareto ef cient in the sense
that, given any initial state u0, there exists planner weights
such that the allocation would have been chosen by a social
planner maximizing the objective function in footnote 11.
All other equilibria considered in this paper, including the
AWE with switch in two periods, are not Pareto optimal
because they may imply positive bene ts even after the  rst
period.
22Consider the AWE sustained by the belief that u 5 b.
Then, for all b [ [(=5 2 1)/2, 1], it is easy to verify that:
Vou~b , 0zudp! 5 b
8 1 4b 2 b2
12~2 1 b!
.
2~2 2 b!~1 1 b!2
~3~2 1 b!!2
5 Vou~bdp, bdpzudp!
Vos~b , 0zudp! 5
2
2 1 b
2
b~4 1 8b 1 b2!
12~2 1 b!
.
~2 2 b!~8 1 7b 1 2b2!
~3~2 1 b!!2
5 Vos~bdp, bdpzudp!
Vy~b , 0, 0 zudp! 5
~6 2 b!~1 1 b!2
12~2 1 b!
.
~7b 1 10!~2 2 b!~1 1 b!2
4~3~2 1 b!!2
5 Vy~bdp, bdp, bdpzudp!,
where each left-hand-side (right-hand-side) term of the
inequality represents the utility in an AWE (PWE). The
result can be generalized to any u $ u(b). For some u .
udp, however, counterexamples can be constructed.
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voter (who, recall, is a net recipient of current
transfers) to set b to a level low enough to
induce a switch of majority. The second factor,
which reinforces the previous effect, is the de-
pendence of future redistribution on current re-
distribution. Rational voters understand that, by
voting for lower bene ts today, they can trigger
a change in the identity of the future median
voter, and indirectly reduce future bene ts and
current taxes. This indirect effect increases the
gain from restraining bt.
Rational dynamic voting are important for
the existence of multiple equilibria. Formally,
for any b , 1, no myopic voting equilibrium
featuring the termination of an existing welfare
state would exist. To construct a contradiction,
consider a candidate myopic equilibrium where
agents at time zero take as parametric, b# t 5 0
for all t . 0. The old unsuccessful would then
choose b0 so as to maximize V
ou(b0, b# 1, ut) 5
b0 2 ((1 2 b) 1 (b0 1 bb# 1) 1 2u0)b0/4,
given b# 15 0. The solution yields b05 min{3 2
1 1 2 b 2 u0, 1}. But this level of redistribu-
tion is inconsistent with a majority of old un-
successful at time t 5 1, since
U~b0zb# 1 5 0!
5
1 2 b 1 min@3
2
1 1
2
b 2 u0 , 1#
2
.
1
2
for any b, 1.23Thus, the expectation that b15
0 is not rational, and a myopic voting AWE
does not exist. Intuitively, myopic voters do not
recognize that they need to restrain their de-
mand for current redistribution in order to ter-
minate the welfare state. The expectation of
zero future redistribution would, on the con-
trary, induce them to demand a very high level
of redistribution in the current period, so that no
switch of majority would materialize.
Finally, let us discuss the other type of equi-
libria, where the switch of majority and the end
of the welfare state may occur in either one or
two periods, depending on the initial state. Suf-
 cient conditions for such equilibria to be sus-
tained are provided in part 2 of Proposition 3 in
the Appendix. In short, these equilibria are sus-
tained for intermediate values of b and u. An
example is depicted in the two lower panels of
Figure 4.24 The main change, relative to the
other case, is the existence of a range of inter-
mediate levels of initial old unsuccessful, u [
(1 2 , uˆ), where the old unsuccessful in majority
choose 100-percent redistribution. In this case,
the sequence of equilibrium redistribution is:
b0 5 1, b15 u, and bt 5 0 @t . 1. Formally,
the equilibrium policies are given by:
(13) Baw~u t ! 5
u if u t $ uˆ~b, u!
1 if u t [ ~
1
2
, uˆ~b, u!!
0 if u t [ @0,
1
2
#
(14) Uaw~b t ! 5
1
2
~1 2 b 1 bu 1 b t ! .
1
2
if b t. u;
Upl~b t ! #
1
2
if b t # u.
The intuition for AWE with switch in two pe-
riods is the following. Since the cost of redis-
tribution, tt/bt, is increasing with ut, setting
bt 5 u is optimal, for a range of large u. This
opens up a new strategic opportunity for econ-
omies starting out with an intermediate u [u0 [
(1 2 , uˆ(b, u )), see Figure 4]. Namely, the
23An anti-welfare equilibriumwith myopic voting exists
in the particular case where b 5 1. In this case, given the
expectation that b# 1 5 0, the private decision rule of the
myopic voting equilibrium is U(b0) 5 b0/ 2, implying that
a majority of old successful materializes in period one,
irrespective of the choice of b0. In fact, the old unsuccessful
choose b0 5 1 implying u1 5 12 and the end of the welfare
state.
24 The necessary and suf cient conditions on the range
of parameters (b) and beliefs (u) that sustain AWE with
switch in two periods can also be characterized, but are
involved, and are therefore not stated here. Details are
available upon request. As a more general remark, we are
unfortunately unable to provide a proof that the equilibria
characterized exhaust the set of equilibria consistent with
De nition 1.
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median voter chooses 100-percent redistribu-
tion and induces, in the next period, a majority
of old unsuccessful (u1 [ [uˆ(b, u ), 1]) which
will set b 5 u and which, in turn, will induce
the breakdown of the welfare state two periods
ahead.
In summary, the previous results imply,
jointly, that multiple self-ful lling equilibria ex-
ist when ut . 0.5, provided that b is not too
small. In one of these equilibria, the welfare
state survives, while it is terminated in the oth-
ers. No AWE exists when b is suf ciently
small. The reason is that strategic voting con-
siderations become less important when agents
discount the future more highly, since private
investments become less sensitive to expecta-
tions about future political decisions. In fact,
myopic voting and rational voting equilibria
coincide for b 5 0.
III. Wage Inequality and Political Support for
the Welfare State
In this section, we analyze the effects of
changes in pretax inequality on the political
equilibrium. To this end, we extend the model
by allowing the wage of the successful agents,
w, to differ from unity. Note that w parameter-
izes the degree of technological inequality—a
large w implies large inequality. The absolute
wage level has no effect on the equilibrium of
our linear model, which justi es maintaining
the normalization that the wage of the unsuc-
cessful agents is equal to zero. Furthermore, bt
now denotes the bene t rate, which implies that
unsuccessful agents earn a before-tax income of
btw, and that the constraint bt [ [0, 1] is
maintained.
The optimal effort choice in this extension
implies
u t1 1 5 1 2 e*t
5 1
2
max$~2 2 ~1 1 b!w 1 b tw
1 bb t1 1w!, 0%,
where the constraint ut1 1 $ 0 is never binding
if w # 1. The tax rate consistent with the
balanced government budget constraint is tt 5
1 2 (ut1 1 1 ut)wbt.
It can immediately be established that the
political equilibrium necessarily features a wel-
fare state as long as w , 1/(1 1 b). In this
case, given any initial ut, we have that ut1 1 .
1 2 irrespective of the redistribution policy cho-
sen by the  rst generation, and the unsuccessful
are always in majority from the second period
and onwards. Thus, the equilibrium features a
unique steady state characterized by positive
redistribution, irrespective of initial conditions
or expectations.
For a range of intermediate values of w, the
equilibrium features multiple steady states, and
the welfare state never arises if u0 # 1 2 , while
it survives perpetually if u0. 1 2 . An extension
of the argument of Proposition 2 ensures that
there does not exist an anti-welfare equilibrium
for this intermediate range of wage inequality,
i.e., a majority of unsuccessful agents do not
strategically hand over power to the next gen-
eration of successful individuals. Next, for an-
other range of intermediate, larger values of w,
there exist both an equilibrium featuring the
breakdown of the welfare state and one featur-
ing its perpetual survival, as analyzed in Section
II, subsection B, part 2 (recall that if w 5 1,
then there exist multiple equilibria, provided
that b is suf ciently large). Finally, for suf -
ciently large values of w, there exists no equi-
librium featuring a welfare state for more than
one period.25
As suggested by this discussion, the model
makes predictions about the effect of technology-
driven changes in wage inequality. Assume, for
25 To see why the welfare state cannot survive when w is
suf ciently large, consider the case of b 5 0. This is the
most robust case for the survival of the welfare state, since
the old unsuccessful in majority have no strategic motive to
induce the breakdown of the welfare state. In this case, if
u0 . 12, the equilibrium bene t rate is given by
arg max
b
@b 2 ~max$2 2 w~1 2 b!, 0% 1 2u!b/4#
$
1
2
1
1 2 u
w
,
which is decreasing in w , so that equilibrium b0 is
bounded from below by 12. But, then, u1 5 max{1 2
w(1 2 b0)/ 2, 0} , 12 for suf ciently large w. Hence,
irrespective of the initial value of u, the majority in the
subsequent periods opposes redistribution, provided that w
is suf ciently large.
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instance, that there is an unexpected permanent
increase in the premium to education. As a
result, agents increase their investment in edu-
cation and a larger proportion will, ex post, be
opposed to redistributional policies. Thus, the
initial impact of technological inequality is
magni ed by reduced support for the welfare
state.26 This prediction of the model is in line
with important events characterizing the last
quarter of the twentieth century. The skill-
biased technical change that, as documented by
a number of authors, started in the 1970’s (see,
among others, Lawrence F. Katz and Kevin M.
Murphy, 1992), was followed by the electoral
success of conservative governments, whose
political platform included a reduction of the
redistributive role of governments, especially in
Anglo-Saxon countries. It is interesting to ob-
serve that not all industrialized countries went
through similar political changes, though. This
observation is consistent with the argument of
our paper for two reasons. First, we predict that
multiple self-ful lling expectations exist. As a
matter of fact, the investment in education in-
creased more in the United States than in con-
tinental Europe, which is consistent with the
expectation of less future redistribution in the
United States than in Europe.27 Second, if other
institutions (e.g., unions) compress the wage
structure and prevent the productivity differ-
ences from giving rise to large wage inequali-
ties, the investment incentives do not change
signi cantly, and the constituency for the wel-
fare state does not dry up in countries where
these institutions are established. This can ex-
plain why countries experiencing a lower in-
crease in pretax inequality also reformed their
welfare state institutions less radically.
Finally, in our stylized model, all agents are
ex ante identical and there is no constraint pre-
venting agents from making an educational in-
vestment. In reality, agents differ in both ability
and the extent to which capital market imper-
fections restrain their educational choice. If we
extend the model in this dimension, it is clear
that low-skill or poor agents who cannot in-
crease their educational effort are destined to
suffer from both the increasing relative demand
for skills and the induced loss of constituency
for the welfare state.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the dynamics
of redistribution under repeated voting, assum-
ing agents to be fully rational and forward-
looking. Following previous research, we have
restricted the attention to Markov perfect equi-
libria. In contrast to most previous papers, how-
ever, we have provided analytical solutions.
Our theory shows that the political support
for distortionary redistribution can persist over
time, even in a world where agents do not attach
any ex ante value to redistribution. This arises
from agents making irreversible human capital
investments which shape their subsequent po-
litical preferences. Thus, a once-and-for-all
shock can trigger permanent changes in the size
of governments (e.g., the Great Depression).
Yet, our paper also shows the possibility of
reversals. This possibility is intrinsically asso-
ciated with the forward-looking nature of the
political process (dynamic voting). If agents
believe that the breakdown of the welfare state
is possible, they vote strategically so as to in-
duce, in the future, a change in the identity of
the median voter and the end of the welfare
state. The model also shows when such rever-
sals are more likely. In particular, increasing
wage (productivity) inequality driven by tech-
nological factors tend to undermine rather than
strengthen the welfare state. This prediction is
consistent with the scaling down of redistribu-
tive policies that has been observed, especially
in Anglo-Saxon countries, in the 1980’s.
We believe that our approach can be fruit-
fully applied to a variety of areas of research. In
particular, it could be integrated into the eco-
nomics of transition and into positive analysis
of constitutions. More in general, we hope that
26Acemoglu et al. (2001) explore a related idea, arguing
that skill-biased technical change has been the cause of
deunionization which, in turn, has magni ed the initial
increase of inequality. Their argument, however, is very
different from ours, and not based on political economy
mechanisms.
27During the period 1975–1990, the average years of
secondary or higher education for the population over 25
increased by about one year in the average EU country, and
by about 22 months in the United States. In the same period,
the average years of higher education in the same popula-
tion group increased by two months in the EU and by almost
eight months in the United States. (Source: Data set of
Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, 1993.)
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it can contribute to the development of dynamic
macroeconomic models embedding politico-
economic aspects.
In some related work in progress (Hassler et
al., 2003), we introduce risk aversion, allowing
for an insurance motive in redistribution pro-
grams. We also explore alternative political
mechanisms, featuring more political in uence
for minorities. In future work, we also plan to
investigatewhether the political mechanism can
amplify technological shocks and generate per-
sistence at business-cycles frequencies. Finally,
we plan to analyze policies that discriminate
between inter- and intragenerational redistribu-
tion such as age-dependent subsidies or public
debt.
APPENDIX
Statement of Proposition 3
PROPOSITION 3: Let b 0.570 be the real solution to the equation (1 1=b)215 b, where b .
u# (b) for all b $ b, and u# (b) is as in Proposition 2.
Then, for all b $ b and u [ [b, b], there exists an “anti-welfare equilibrium” (AWE), Baw,
Uaw , with the following characteristics:
Part 1: “Switch in one period.” If b $ (=5 2 1)/2 0.618, then, for all u [ [u(b), b], Baw(ut)
and Uaw(bt) are given, respectively, by equations (11) and (12), where u(b) [ 1 1 b 2
=b(1 1 b) and u(b) # b for all b $ (=5 2 1)/2 and Upl(bt) is de ned in Proposition 1.
Part 2: “Switch in one or two periods.” If b $ b, then, for all u [ [b, min{b, u(b)}), Baw(ut) and
Uaw(bt) are given, respectively, by equations (13) and (14), where u(b) . b for all b, and
uˆ(b, u) [ 1 2 (2 1 b 2 (2b 1 3 2 u)u) z (1 2 u)21.
Proofs of Propositions
For notational convenience, the indirect utilities are, in this Appendix, rewritten as follows:
Vˆ j~b t , u t ! ; V j~b t , B~U~b t !!, u t !, for j [ $os, ou%.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
We must show that the pair Bi, U i , for i [ { pl, dp}, satis es the equilibrium conditions
1) Bi(ut) 5 arg maxbtVˆ
d(bt, ut) subject to bt [ [0, 1]; and
2) U i(bt) 5 (1 2 b 1 bt 1 bB
i(U i(bt)))/ 2,
where d 5 os if i 5 pl and d 5 ou if i 5 dp.
If i 5 pl, it is straightforward to see that Vˆos is maximized by setting bt 5 0 in every period and
that, consequently, u t 5
1 2 b
2
for all t $ 1.
Next, consider the DP equilibrium.
First, we note that
(A1) Bdp~Udp~b t !! 5
3bdp 2 b t
2
if b t$
2b
2 1 b
1 else,
where we used the fact that for any bt [ [0, 1], U
dp(bt) , u# . Then, Vˆt
ou can be expressed as:
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(A2) Vˆ t
ou~b t , u t ! 5
b t 2
1
4 X 1 2 b 1 b t 1 b 3b
dp 2 b t
2
1 2u tD b t if b t$ 2b2 1 b
b t2
1
4
~1 1 b t1 2u t !b t else.
Maximizing Vˆt
ou over bt yields;
b t 5
3
2
2 u t if u t. u# ~b!
bdp 2
2
2 2 b
~u t2 u
dp! if u t [
3
2
2
2
2 1 b
, u# ~b!
1 if u t [ 0,
3
2
2
2
2 1 b
5 Bdp~u t ! .
This proves that equilibrium condition 1 is satis ed.
To prove that the second condition is satis ed, we use (A1) to substitute for bt1 1 in the optimal
investment expression, giving,
~1 2 b 1 b t 1 bB
dp~Udp~b t !!! /2 5
udp 1
2 2 b
4
~b t 2 b
dp! if b t [
2b
2 1 b
, 1
1 1 bt
2
else
5 Udp~b t !.
To see the steps of the  rst part of the proof in more detail, de ne Vˆa(ut) and Vˆ
b(ut) as follows:
Vˆ a~u t ! ; max
bt [ @0,~2b/~21b!!#
Vˆ t
ou~b t , u t !
5
9
16
2
3
4
u t1
1
4
u t
2 ; Vˆa,int~u t ! if u t .
6 2 b
2~2 1 b!
b
6 1 b 2 2u t ~2 1 b!
2~2 1 b!2
; Vˆa,cor~u t ! else
Vˆb~u t ! ; max
bt [ @~2b/~21b!!,1#
Vˆ t
ou~bt , u t !
5
1
8
~b2 2 3b 1 2u t ~2 1 b! 2 6!
2
~2 2 b!~2 1 b!2
; Vˆb ,int~u t ! if u t $
3
2
2
2
~2 1 b!
1
8
8 1 b~6 2 b!
2 1 b
2
u t
2
; Vˆb,cor~u t ! else,
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where Vˆa,cor(ut) and Vˆ
b,cor(ut) result from corner solutions in the respective ranges (the corners
being b t 5
2b
2 1 b
and bt 5 1, respectively) while Vˆ
a,int(ut) and Vˆ
b,int(ut) result from the interior
solutions b t 5
3
2
2 u t and b t 5 b
dp 2
2
2 2 b
~u t 2 u
dp!, respectively.
First, standard algebra establishes that Vˆb,int~ut! 2 Vˆ
a,cor~ut! 5
1
8
~b22 2but2 b1 62 4ut!
2
~22 b!~21 b!2
. 0
and that, in the range where ut #
3
2
2
2
~21 b!
, Vˆb,cor~ut!2 Vˆ
a,cor~ut! .
1
8
~2 2 b!
4~12 b!1 b2
~21 b!2
. 0.
Thus, whenever Vˆa(ut) 5 Vˆ
a,cor(ut), then Vˆ
b(ut) . Vˆ
a(ut).
Second, if b, 23 , then
6 2 b
2~2 1 b!
. 1 and Vˆa(ut) 5 Vˆ
a,cor(ut) for all ut. Thus, Vˆ
b(ut) . Vˆ
a(ut)
if b , 23 .
Third, note that if b $ 23 , then there exists a range of ut, where Vˆ
a(ut) 5 Vˆ
a,int(ut). In this range,
standard algebra establishes that Vˆb,int(ut) . Vˆ
a,int(ut) for all ut provided that b , (=17 2 1)/4.
Thus, b , (=17 2 1)/4 implies that Vˆb(ut) . Vˆ
a(ut) for all ut [ [0, 1].
Finally, consider the range of parameters such that b $ (=17 2 1)/4, implying u# # 1. In this
case, for all 1 $ ut . u# (b), Vˆ
b(ut) , Vˆ
a(ut) 5 Vˆ
a,int(ut).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
We must show that for all t and ut, B
pw, Upw satis es the two equilibrium conditions
1) Bpw(ut) 5 arg maxbt{Vˆ
pw(bt, ut)} subject to bt [ [0, 1]; and
2) Upw(bt) 5 (1 2 b 1 bt 1 bB
pw(Upw(bt)))/ 2, where Vˆ
pw(bt, ut) 5 Vˆ
os(bt, ut) if ut # 1 2 and
Vˆpw(bt, ut) 5 Vˆ
ou(bt, ut) otherwise.
We start from condition 1. Consider  rst ut # 1 2 . Then, Vt
pw(bt, ut) 5 Vt
os(bt, ut), which is
maximized by setting bt 5 0.
Then, consider ut . 1 2 . First, we de ne
u# ~b! ; min$b, u˜~b!%,
where
(A3) u˜~b! ;
1 1 b
2
2
b~2 1 b!
2
if b .
17 2 4
4
1 1 b
2
2
b~6 1 b!
2
1 1 b
2 1 b
else.
Now, note that u # u# (b) # b, implying that Upw(bt) # (.) 1 2 if bt # (.) u. Thus,
(A4) Bpw~Upw~b t !! 5
3bdp 2 b t
2
if b t $
2b
2 1 b
1 b t [ X u, 2b2 1 bD
0 b t # u,
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and
Vˆ t
ou~b tu t ! 5
b t 2
1
4 X 1 2 b 1 b t 1 b 3b
dp 2 b t
2
1 2u tD b t if b t$ 2b2 1 b
b t2
1
4
~1 1 b t1 2u t !b t b t [ X u, 2b2 1 bD
b t2
1
4
~1 2 b 1 b t1 2u t !b t b t# u.
Comparing this to (A2), we see that utility in the PWE is identical to utility under DP for bt .
u. Thus, a suf cient condition for equilibrium condition 1 to be satis ed for ut . 1 2 is that in this
range, maxbt. uVˆt
ou(bt, ut) $ maxbt# uVˆt
ou(bt, ut). It is straightforward to verify that this is the case
for suf ciently low u, in particular when u # u˜(b), which is implied by u # u#(b).
To prove that the second condition is satis ed, we use (A4) to substitute for bt1 1 in the optimal
investment expression, giving,
~1 2 b 1 b t1 bB
pw~Upw~b t !!!/2 5
X 1 2 b 1 b t 1 b 3bdp 2 b t2 D 2 if b t $ 2b2 1 b
~1 1 b t !/2, b t [ X u, 2b2 1 bD
1 2 b 1 b t
2
b t # u
5 Upw~b t ! ,
where we used u # u#(b) # b.
To see the steps in the proof of the  rst condition in more detail, we  rst note that u # b, implies
that maxbt#uVˆt
ou(bt, ut) is a corner solution with bt 5 u, and utility equal to
3 1 b 2 u 2 2u t
4
u. It
is easily veri ed that the difference maxbt. uVˆt
ou(bt, ut) 2 maxbt#uVˆt
ou(bt, ut) is minimized at ut 5
1, where it is given by
1
16
2
1
4
u~3 1 b 2 ~2 1 u!! if b .
17 2 4
4
1
8
~1 1 b!
2 1 b~1 2 b!
~2 1 b!2
2
1
4
u~3 1 b 2 ~2 1 u!! if b #
17 2 4
4
.
Solving maxbt. uVˆt
ou(bt, ut) 2 maxbt# uVˆt
ou(bt, ut) 5 0 for u, yields (A3). Finally, it is trivial to
verify that udp5 Upw(Bpw(udp)) and upl 5 Upw(Bpw(upl)) and that the root of ut1 1 5 U
pw(Bpw(ut))
is 12 , which establishes points 1–2 of the proposition.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
As in the Proof of Proposition 1, we must show that, for all t and ut, B
aw, Uaw satis es
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1) Baw(ut) 5 arg maxbt{Vˆ
aw(bt, ut)}, subject to ut1 1 5 U
aw(bt), bt [ [0, 1] and bt1 1 5
Baw(ut1 1); and
2) Uaw(bt) 5 (1 2 b 1 bt 1 bB
aw(Uaw(bt)))/ 2.
1. Consider  rst the case when b $
5 2 1
2
and u [ [u(b), b]. Note  rst that in the range
b $
5 2 1
2
, u ~b! # b, ensuring that the set of beliefs under consideration is nonempty. To
prove part (1), consider,  rst, the range where ut . 1 2 .
Vˆaw~b t , u t ! 5 Vˆ
ou~b t , u t !
5
b t 2
1
4
~1 2 b 1 b t 1 bu 1 2u t !b t if b t. u
b t2
1
4
~1 2 b 1 b t 1 2ut !b t if bt # u.
Standard differentiation shows that Vˆaw(bt, ut) is increasing in bt for all bt # u (since u # b)
and that, as long as u $ u(b),
Vˆaw~u, u t ! 5 u 2
1
4
~1 2 b 1 u 1 2u t !u
. b t 2
1
4
~1 2 b 1 b t 1 bu 1 2u t !b t 5 Vˆ
aw~b t . u, u t ! ,
for all b t . u and u t . 1 2 . Thus, B
aw(ut) 5 u for u t . 1 2 .
If u t # 1 2 , Vˆ
aw(bt, u t) 5 Vˆ
os(b t, ut), which is decreasing in b t. Hence, B
aw(ut) 5 0, for
u t # 1 2 .
To prove part (2), observe that
~1 2 b 1 b t 1 bB
aw~Uaw~b t !!!/ 2 5 5 ~1 2 b 1 b t 1 bu !/ 2 if b t . u~1 2 b 1 b t !/ 2 if b t # u 5 Uaw~b t ! ,
where the equality follows from the facts that, for all bt # u # b, (1 2 b 1 bt)/ 2 # 1 2 ,
and, for all bt . u $ u (b), 1 2 (1 2 b 1 bu 1 bt) . 1 2 . The latter inequality can be
checked by inserting the de nition of u(b) in the left-hand side of the inequality.
2. Consider now the case when b $ b and u [ [b, min{b, u(b)}). Note  rst that b , u(b) for all
b $ b, implying that the set of beliefs under consideration is nonempty.
As to part (1), consider,  rst, the range where ut . 1 2 .
Vˆaw~b t , u t ! 5 Vˆ
ou~b t , u t !
5
b t2
1
4
~1 2 b 1 b t 1 bu 1 2u t !b t if b t. u
b t2
1
4
~1 2 b 1 b t 1 2ut !b t if b t# u.
It is immediate to see that the value function has a discontinuous fall at bt 5 u. Moreover,
standard differentiation shows that Vˆaw(bt, ut) is increasing in bt, throughout in the region bt #
u, and provided that ut $ uˆ(b, u ) in the region bt . u. Furthermore,
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(A5) Vˆaw~1, u t ! 2 Vˆ
aw~u, u t ! 5 ~1 2
1
4
~1 2 b 1 2u t !!~1 2 u ! 2
1
4
~1 1 bu 2 u2!
is a decreasing function of u t, strictly positive for u t [ (0.5, uˆ(b , u )), equal to zero when
u t 5 uˆ(b, u ), and strictly positive for ut [ (uˆ(b , u ), 1]. Thus, in the range ut [ (0.5, uˆ(b,
u )], Vˆaw(1, u t) $ Vˆ
aw(u, u t), with equality holding if and only if u t 5 uˆ(b , u ). This shows
that setting b t 5 1 is optimal for the old unsuccessful in the range ut [ (0.5, uˆ(b, u )] and,
hence, Baw(ut) 5 1 in that range.
Finally, we need to show that setting bt 5 u is optimal for the old unsuccessful in the range
u t [ (uˆ(b, u ), 1]. Since, as already noted, Vˆ
aw(bt, u t) is increasing in bt for all b t # u, it
remains to be shown that Vˆaw(u, ut) . maxb [ (u ,1]{Vˆ
aw(b , ut)} when ut [ ( uˆ(b, u ), 1].
This can be shown as follows.
(a) First, note that if u t [ X uˆ~b, u !, 12 1 b~1 2 u !2 , then, arg maxb[ (u ,1]{Vˆaw(b, ut)} 5 1. In
this case, as pointed out above [see equation (A5) and the following discussion], Vˆaw(u, ut) .
Vˆaw(1, ut), establishing the claim.
(b) Next, if u t [
1
2
1
b~1 2 u !
2
, 1 , then b*~u, u t! ; arg maxb [ ~u,1#$Vˆaw~b, u t !% 5
3
2
1
b~1 2 u !
2
2 u t , 1. De ne, then,
DVˆ~u t , b, u ! ; Vˆaw~u, u t ! 2 Vˆaw~b*~u, u t ! , u t ! 5 ~2
1
2
u 1
1
4
b 1
3
4
2 1
4
bu !u t
2 1
4
u t
2 1 3
4
u 1
5
8
bu 2
1
4
u2 2
1
16
b2 2
9
16
2 3
8
b 2
1
16
b2u2 1
1
8
b2u.
Since DVˆ(ut, b, u ) is hump-shaped in ut, it must attain its minimum in the range ut [
1
2
1
b~1 2 u !
2
, 1 at either u t 5
1
2
1
b~1 2 u !
2
or ut 5 1. It turns out that
DVˆX 12 1 b~1 2 u !2 , b, uD 5 14 ~21 1 2u 2 u2~1 2 b!!
$
1
4
~21 1 2b 2 b2~1 2 b!! $ 0
DVˆ~1, b , u ! 5 1
4
~2~1 1 1
4
b2!u2 1 1
2
~2 1 b!~1 1 b!u 2 1
4
~1 1 b!2!
$ 1
4
~2~1 1 1
4
b2!b2 1 1
2
~2 1 b!~1 1 b!b 2 1
4
~1 1 b!2! $ 0.
Thus, Baw(ut) 5 u for ut . uˆ(b, u ).
The proof for the range ut # 1 2 is identical to the  rst case and thus, part (1) is proved.
To prove part (2), observe that
~1 2 b 1 b t 1 bB
aw~Uaw~b t !!!/ 2 5 5 ~1 2 b 1 b t 1 bu !/ 2 if b t. u~1 2 b 1 b t !/ 2 else 5 Uaw~bt !,
where the equality follows from the fact that (1 2 b 1 bt)/ 2 , 1 2 for all bt , u, and that (1 2
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b 1 bt 1 bu )/ 2 $ uˆ(b, u ) for all bt [ (u, 1]. The latter can be checked as follows. Recall
that, in the range under consideration, b $ b and u $ b. Then:
~1 2 b 1 b t 1 bu !/ 2 2 uˆ~b, u ! . ~1 2 b 1 u 1 bu !/ 2 2 uˆ~b, u !
$ ~21 2 2b 1 ~3 1 4b!b 2 ~2 1 b!b2!
1
2~1 2 u !
$ ~21 2 2b 1 ~3 1 4b!b 2 ~2 1 b!b2!
1
2~1 2 u !
. 0.
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